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I. INTRODUCTION
The taking of a bribe or gratuity, should be punished with as
severe penalties as the defrauding of the State.
- William Penn'
If all statesmen shared this ideology, there would be no need for
this article. However, a glance at current business journals and news
agencies shows the great necessity to address global corrupt practices in
today's transnational business environment.2 No matter what label you
* Adjunct Professor St. Thomas University School of Law, B.S., 1990, University of
Missouri at St. Louis; Juris Doctor, 1993, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law
Center; Candidate for LL.M., 1995, University of Miami School of Law.
1. WILLIAM PENN, SOME FRUITS OF SOLITUDE, IN REFLECTIONS AND MAXIMS 76 (Intro.
by Edmond Goss, Folcroft Library ed. 1976).
2. See Chris Blackhurst, Civil Servant Who Enjoyed Life of Luxury on Proceeds of
Corruption, INDEPENDENT (London), May 27, 1994, at 2 (3d ed.) (stating British official took
"backhanders from foreign firms in return for dishing out tens of millions of pounds in orders");
Svenska Dagbladet, Kockums Smutskastas, SKAANSKA DAGBLADET (Malmoe, Sweden), Apr. 26,
1994, at 27 (stating Swedish company tried to bribe officials in the Pakistani foreign ministry);
Peter K. Semler, U.S. Firms Shift Strategy, Push for Anti-Corruption Law Abroad, J. COM.
(Bangkok, Thailand), Apr. 18, 1994, at 8a (reporting of kickbacks paid by British companies to
vlalaysian officials); A Series of Alleged Corruption Scandals, ECONOMIST INTELLEGENCE
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use, pot-de-vin, unto amarillo, schmiergeld, mordida, esca, or grease
payment, there is no disputing that today's global business market is
riddled with corruption. All too often these "accommodating" payments
target public officials in order to secure favorable treatment in
transnational business matters.' As international trade and investment
increases, the need for an international foreign corrupt practices treaty
becomes more apparent.
This article will first evaluate past domestic and international
attempts at combating transnational bribery of public officials by
businesses. Next, the author will identify and describe the current
international efforts in combating bribery of foreign officials. The third
segment of this paper will identify why it is in the world community's best
interest to adopt a multilateral treaty to fight these "accommodating"
payments. The author will then propose a draft of such a treaty that would
be completely different from the past failed efforts. Critical thought on
why this treaty should not emulate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) will be put forth. Finally, avenues will be identified which will
facilitate the ultimate ratification of this draft by the international
community.
II. ANALYZING PAST INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO COMBAT
CORRUPT PAYMENTS TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS
Bribes and kickbacks have gone hand-in-hand with human
commerce since the birth of mankind.' In the global market place,
"Corruption is common because the rusty machinery of international
business calls out for lubrication."5 In fact, "greasing" of public officials
UNIT, COUNTRY REP. (New York), Oct. 18, 1993, available in Westlaw, Bus-Int'l Database
(stating that a Turkish political party was questioned regarding irregularities of money payments
from General Dynamics Corporation of the United States); The Government Says It Will Clean
Out Corruption, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REP. (New York), Feb. 15, 1993,
available in Westlaw, Bus-Int'l Database (alleging that Botswana Housing Administration is
accepting bribes from foreign contractors).
3. L. Cutler & D. Drory, TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CODE ON ILLICIT PAYMENTS, IN
EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: MULTINATIONAL CODES
AND CORPORATE CONDUCT 34-35 (Seymour J. Rubin & Gary C. Hufbauer eds., 1984).
4. See RAMSEY MACMULLEN, CORRUPTION AND THE DECLINE OF ROME (1978); JOHN T.
NOONAN, BRIBES 839 (1994); John Impert, A Program for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 J. INT'L L. & PRAC.
1009 (1993).
5. Clean, Not Laundered, 327 ECONOMIST 78 (1993) (reporting that former World Bank
leader, Peter Eigen, speaks out on the appalling rate of bribery and extortion in international
commerce and economic development).
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is seen as a way of life in many societies.6 Switzerland has only recently
considered the revocation of a long standing law that allowed businesses a
tax deduction on payments of overseas bribes.' Although there is a
widespread acceptance of some forms of commercial "accommodation"
payments, both the United States and the international community have
made several attempts to curtail ongoing corrupt payments to public
officials.
Nearly every nation has made it a crime to bribe or attempt to
bribe its state officials.' The United States is the only nation that currently
has domestic laws in place to outlaw bribery of foreign public officials.9
The FCPA ° is America's main weapon in fighting illicit payments to public
officials overseas. The Watergate investigation's exposure of huge secret
corporate slush funds, used to finance bribery of foreign officials, acted as
the catalyst for the formation of the FCPA." The FCPA was an attempt to
halt the perceived erosion of corporate America's integrity." The
American legislature seized the initiative and passed the FCPA provisions
in 1977 assuming that a universal treaty was probable, impending, or at
6. See RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS
ENVIRONMENT 416-19 (2d ed. 1993) (noting the cross cultural acceptance of bribery of foreign
public officials in the nations of Italy, Germany, France, Japan, and Argentina); SEYMOUR J.
RUBIN & GARY C. HUFBAUER, EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT 38 (1984); Steve Levine, Survey of Azerbaijan: Oil and Bribery Lubricate The
Wheels, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at 2; Susan Hayward, Pact May Inhibit Corruption, J.
COM., Oct. 8, 1993, at 4A; Milan Ruzicka, Bribery Mars Business Relations in Eastern Europe,
J. COM., Sept. 1, 1993, at IA.
7. Switzerland: Bribes May Soon Become Nondeductible, CROSSBORDER MONITOR, Mar.
16, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Busint File; see also RUBIN & HURBAUER, supra
note 6, at 39 (Germany likewise had been granting tax deductions for these payments.).
8. See NOONAN, supra note 4, at 702; Louise R. Driscoll, The Illegality of Bribery: Its
Roots, Essence and Universality, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 13-38 (1984); Judson Wambold,
Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Payments Abroad, 10 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 231, 235 (1977).
9. Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of
Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185 (1994); RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 39; E. Ernest
Goldstein, European Views of United States Anti-Bribery and Anti-Boycott Legislation, 1 N.W.J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 363, 364 (1979) (stating that every major European nation prohibits bribery of
its officials). But see Michael Bogdan, International Trade and the New Swedish Provisions on
Corruption, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 665 (1979) (Sweden has attempted to enforce criminal
legislation that is considered similar to America's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.).
10. 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff, 78m (1991).
11. Arthur Aronoff, Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 789
P.L.I. 799 (1992); Raymond Dowd, Civil RICO Misread: The Judicial Repeal of the 1988
Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 946, 948 (1991);
Wallace Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 235 (1982).
12. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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the very least reasonably attainable in the near future.'3 However, after
being amended in 1988 to clarify its language, the FCPA remains a
unilateral approach against foreign corruption.
The purpose of the FCPA is to deter a wide variety of activities
which are deemed "corrupt." As amended, the FCPA includes accounting
measures, anti-bribery provisions," affirmative defenses, 6  and an
advisory opinion process." Enforcement of this Act is the responsibility
of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Attorney
General. Violators of the Act could face stiff monetary fines and possible
prison terms. 8 The FCPA is only one of the many possible legislative
enactments that could be used to curtail illicit payments by United States
business to foreign public officials. 9 The FCPA has been hailed as the
13. Hirschorn, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrowed, Significantly Clarified, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 2, 1988, at 16; Franklin Gevurtz, Using the Anti-Trust Laws to Combat Overseas
Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade, 27 VA. J. INT'L
L. 211 (1987). ("When Congress enacted the FCPA, it hoped that multilateral treaties would
follow under which other trading nations would pledge to join in prohibiting corrupt acts
committed by their own nationals."); S. RES. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 36,
108 (1975); S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986); 78 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2010 at
27 (Jan. 1978) (statement of President Carter) ("The FCPA can only be successful in combating
bribery and extortion if other countries and businesses themselves take comparable action," the
President presumes other countries would follow.).
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West 1991) (provisions which require United States businesses to
keep a running record of their internal financial activities so as to allow the government, among
other things, to accurately investigate alleged foreign corrupt payments).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (West 1991) (outlawing "payments" to foreign
officials or foreign political parties and provides the "knowingly" standard).
16. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(b), (c), 78dd-2(b), (c) (West 1991) (providing for the "routine
governmental action" exception and affirmative defenses that include a "lawful" payment in light
of foreign governments laws and the affirmative defense that such payments were "directly
related to promotion, demonstration or explanation of the products or services; or the execution
or performance of a contract with a foreign contract with a agency thereof").
17. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(e), 78dd-2(f) (West 1991) (establishing a review procedure in
which specific inquiries by issuers can be analyzed in light of the FCPA prohibited acts sections);
see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(j-k) (1991) (providing the details of the review procedure and
normally requires a thirty day response time by the Department of Justice).
18. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (West 1991) (Fining could reach up to $2,000,000.00 and prison
terms as long as 5 years.).
19. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 37 (The Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the
International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976 indirectly help limit the
occurrence of United States bribes targeted at overseas officials.); Aronoff, supra note 11
(Antitrust and RICO Laws may be basis to combat international illicit payments by United States
businesses.); 134 CONG. REC. H183 & H2117 (1988) (Conference Committee rejecting Senate's
exclusivity provisions of the FCPA and thus leaving the door open for concurrent prosecution
under wire and mail fraud statutes).
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"harshest, most comprehensive effort" to combat corrupt payments to
foreign public officials."0
The 1988 Amendments were seen by most as the United States'
attempt at "damage control." American law makers were criticized by
their constituents for passing an act that had a chilling affect on United
States businesses and exports. 1 The 1988 amendments were an attempt to
increase the competitiveness of United States business and to provide a
level playing field in the international market place.22
To date, the FCPA still suffers from many problems. The Act is
still considered vague by many in the legal and international business
community, and thus its enforcement is always an issue.2" In light of the
20. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 219,
221 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
21. Laura Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is To Be Done with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431 (1987); S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1986): The Committee recognizes the continuing need for international agreements
outlawing bribery in the international marketplace. The unilateral position currently taken by the
United States in terms of anti-bribery legislation, while laudable, constitutes a serious
disadvantage to U.S. commerce. The Committee recognizes that bribery warps appropriate trade
patterns and distorts the market as an efficient allocator of resources, but it believes that the most
useful approach to this problem is a multilateral one. The Committee bill would enhance U.S.
efforts to achieve such international agreement by presenting a statute that effectively curbs
bribery without imposing unnecessary trade disincentives. Recognizing this need, the bill calls
for renewed efforts, both on multilateral and bilateral levels, to achieve international agreement
on the prohibition of bribery. Id. See also, 131 CONG. REC. 32,763, 32,778 (daily ed. Nov.
20, 1985) (statements that the 1977 FCPA's unclear language inhibited exports); Judith Roberts,
Revision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill: Will it Reduce the
Compliance Burdens and Anticompetitive Impact? 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 491, 494-956 (1989).
But see 131 CONG. REC. S15,959 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985) (supporting the proposition that the
FCPA was not truly hampering United States exporters in the global marketplace); Judith
Roberts, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An Analysis of Its Impact and Future, 5
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 405, 429-30 (1982) (asserting that the FCPA is not a detriment to
United States trade).
22. 134 CONG. REC. S2589-90 (daily ed. March 18, 1988). Senator Heinz participating in
the debate for the passage of the Trade Act stated:
Now, however, as we continue work on major trade legislation, the issues of the
FCPA and improving the trading position of American businesses increasingly focuses
on both our ability to improve export performance and the various measures already in
place to ensure a level playing field for all competitors. The burden of the U.S. trade
deficit has enormous negative effects on the American economy, and it is clear that we
have to do a better job of clearing away obstacles to export performance
improvements, including ambiguities in the FCPA that discourage our exporters.
23. ALAN SWAN & JOHN MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 263-73, 277-84 (Doc. Supp. 1991)
(interpretation problems of the FCPA Accounting & Bribery Provisions); Pines, supra note 9, at
195 ("Despite amendments in 1988, the FCPA is still plagued with problems that hinder its
purpose. Without clearly defined terms and requirements, the FCPA proves ineffective in
providing guidance for U.S. corporations.").
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recent world events it has become more apparent that American companies
are being locked out of today's global market place due to the FCPA
constraints." ' "Ineffective" and "slow" are the words used to describe the
formal review process which could disclose sensitive information to the
general public and business competitors.2 The FCPA's major flaw
however, is its unilateral character which limits its effectiveness in the
world community.
On the international front, "accommodation" payments have been
publicly criticized by multinational organizations, but privately ignored at
the individual state level. In 1972, the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) announced a set of rules to govern international
transactions which were called "Guidelines for International Investment. ,,26
These guidelines, aimed at eliminating foreign bribes, were so
controversial that the ICC members began to split their ranks.7 By 1977,
two camps emerged in the ICC. Some wanted to follow the United States
lead and adopt provisions similar to the FCPA. However, the majority of
24. See Operational Issues: Coping with Corruption in the CIS, BUS. E. EUR., June 7,
1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Bueeur File (stating foreign firms must be prepared to
offer monetary incentives to Russian officials if they are to do business in the area); James
Morgan, Corruption Without Sin, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1991, at 16 (asserting that to be
competitive in India you must be willing to accept that bribery is a way of life in the business
community); Continued Official U.S. Pressure Called Key to Winning Kuwait Reconstruction
Contracts, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. 472 (1991) (stating that United States companies are at a
disadvantage in the bidding process because the Middle East business environment favors bribes
by foreign countries to secure contracts); Aftermath of Gulf War: Shaping Longer-Term Stability
Major Task, GLOB. FIN. MKTS., Mar. 11, 1991 (stating United States businesses are
"handcuffed" by national laws when competing for contracts in Kuwait). See generally Peter
Semler, U.S. Companies Find Corruption a Competitor, J. COM., Apr. 18, 1994, at 8a (stating
that one United States company recently lost as much as $1.3 billion dollars in a two week period
because it refused to pay grease payments for contracts).
25. SCHAFFER ET AL., supra note 6, at 423:
The procedure has the initial disadvantage of subjecting the transaction to the scrutiny
of the public at large, including the U.S. firm's competitors. These competitors may
be attracted to the situation and propose a more attractive relationship . . . . [The]
delay [of the review period] is not very satisfactory in most business transactions.
While the parties await a response, market conditions may change so as to make the
deal less attractive or entirely unattractive for one of the parties.
Id. See also Katherine M. Albright & Grace Hon, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 30 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 773 (1993) (stating that the relatively ineffective review process, resulted in only
one firm seeking an advisory opinion in the entire year of 1991).
26. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC), Guidelines for International
Investment (1972).
27. JOHN M. KLINE, INTERNATIONAL CODES AND MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS: SETTING
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS OPERATORS 90 (1985).
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the members refused to "follow the American banner on the crusade
against international bribery. "I8
In 1977, the ICC Counsel passed a collection of nonbinding rules
of behavior to condemn bribery in the international market place.29 The
language used in these rules is broad enough so as to appease most ICC
members. One of these basic, generalized rules was phrased, "No one
may demand or accept a bribe."" Other basic rules address "kickbacks"
and "off the books" secret accounts.3 ' The ICC Counsel did, however,
strongly advise the world community to formulate a treaty addressing
overseas bribery. 3  These self-regulating rules, lacking in enforcement
powers and non-binding on businesses, have generally failed to curtail
"accommodation" payments to public officials by foreign companies.
Another non-binding code was announced by the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1976. 33 These
guidelines address multinational enterprises operating in OECD member
countries.3" General anti-bribery provisions found in sections 7 & 8 direct
businesses to:
7. Not render and they should not be solicited or expected
to render-any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or
indirect, to any public servant or holder of public office.
8. Unless legally permissible, not make contributions to
candidates for public office or to political parties or other
political organizations."
However, this code proved to be ineffective in preventing international
illicit payments.36
28. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra
note 20, at 228.
29. Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, ICC Pub. No. 315, (1977), reprinted
in 17 I.L.M. 417 (1978).
30. Id. at 420.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 418.
33. Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (21st June 1976)
Annex to the Declaration of 21st June 1976 by Governments of the OECD Member Countries on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 967.
34. DR. R. BLANPAIN, THE BADGER CASE AND THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 38 (1977).
35. Id.
36. Cynthia D. Wallace, International Codes and Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:
Update and Selected Issues, 17 INT'L LAW. 435, 441 (1983):
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The United Nations has also attempted to regulate international
corrupt payments. On December 15, 1975, the U.N. General Assembly
passed a resolution condemning illicit payments by multinational
corporations." This resolution states that the General Assembly:
1. Condemns all corrupt practices, including bribery, by
transnational and other corporations, their intermediaries
and others involved, in violation of the laws and
regulations of host countries;...
3. Calls upon botl] home and host governments to take,
within their respective national jurisdictions, all necessary
measures which they deem appropriate, including
legislative measures to prevent such corrupt practices, and
to take consequent measures against the violators;
4. Calls upon governments to collect information on such
corrupt practices, as well as on measures taken against
such practices, and to exchange information bilaterally
and, as appropriate, multilaterally... ;
5. Calls upon home governments to cooperate with
governments of the host countries to prevent such corrupt
practices, including bribery, and to prosecute, within their
national jurisdictions, those who engage in such acts; . . .
Other than in the United States, this proclamation was bold on words but
weak in implementation. No other state, besides the United States, has
implemented Section 5 to criminalize this form of corruption. Little, if
any cooperation, requested in sections 4 and 5 has been put forth by U.N.
[The] Declaration, which, along with some member-state "considerations and
understandings" prefacing the Guidelines, is not legally binding by virtue of the OECD
treaty itself, but could be considered to be so in any aspect in which it expresses in
convenient and systematic form some existing rule of general international law, or
could become so by incorporation into a treaty duly ratified by OECD member states;
and . . . the Guidelines, which are expressly stated within their own framework to be
"not legally enforceable 
..
Id.
37. Measures Against Corrupt Practices of Transnational and Other Corporations, Their
Intermediaries and Others Involved, G.A. Res. 3514, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3514 (1975), reprinted
in 15 I.L.M. 180 (1976).
38. Id. at 510.
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member nations. History has revealed that this was just another legislative
code of conduct enforced only in "never-never land."39
An impressive attempt to forge a multilateral treaty against foreign
corrupt payments came before the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC). On May 18, 1979, the U.N. Committee on an
International Agreement on Illicit Payments transmitted a proposed treaty
to ECOSOC." Article I of this draft treaty outlaws and criminalizes:
(a) The offering, promising or giving of any payment, gift
or other advantage by any natural person, on his own
behalf or on behalf of any enterprise or any other person
whether juridical or natural, to or for the benefit of a
public official as undue consideration for performing or
refraining from the performance of his duties in connection
with an international commercial transaction.
(b) The soliciting, demanding, accepting or receiving,
directly or indirectly, by a public official of any payment,
gift or other advantage, as undue consideration for
performing or refraining from the performance of his
duties in connection with an international commercial
transaction.'
Article II defines terms such as "Public Official," "International
Commercial Transaction," and "Intermediary" with more definite terms
than any multinational agreement against corrupt practices has before."2
Other provisions require accounting procedures43 and extradition of alleged
offenders." This draft, penal in nature, was heavily supported by the
United States, but was never adopted by the United Nations. ' This
39. Timothy W. Stanley, International Codes of Conduct for MNC'S: A Skeptical View of
the Process, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (1981).
40. U.N. ECOSOC E/1979/104, May 25, 1979, 2d Reg. Sess., Agenda Item 9; "Report of
the Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit Payments on its First and Second
Sessions" (E/1979/104).
41. Id. art. 1 Sec.(1).
42. Id. art. 2(a), (b), (c).
43. Id. art. 6.
44. Id. art. 11 (1). "The offenses treferred to in Article 1] shall be deemed to be included
as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting
States undertake to include said offence as extraditable offenses in every extradition treaty to be
concluded between them." Id.
45. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 38; Thomas H. Reynolds, Clouds of Codes: The
New International Economic Order Through Codes of Conduct: A Survey, 75 LAW. LIB. J. 315,
1995]
12 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 1
proposed treaty, like all other previous multilateral attempts to outlaw or
condemn international "accommodation" payments, failed to effectively
prevent multinational corporation's corrupt practices.
Recently, the world has seen a flurry of activity by international
organizations determined to stamp out foreign bribery of public officials.
On May 4, 1993, a new organization called Transparency International
met for two days in Berlin for its inaugural conference. ' This nonprofit
organization is dedicated to preventing international kickbacks, bribes, and
corruption. Its goal is to assure that state officials around the globe will
behave in a more "transparent" and honest fashion when considering
international contracts--hence the name Transparency International"7 Its
financial support comes from United States multinational corporations and
European aid agencies."8
Transparency International is a voluntary group that mirrors the
tactics and structure of Amnesty International. 9  Transparency
International seeks to bring corruption out of the shadows in hopes that
such exposure will cause public opinion to demand an end to international
bribery. To effectively fight bribery, Transparency International intends
to introduce legislation similar to the FCPA in all OECD countries,"
request chairmen to annually sign pledges against corruption,5 and to work
towards universal accounting procedures that would disclose overseas
payments." Slowly, this organization intends to establish "Islands of
342-43 (1982) (stating ECOSOC attempts are bogged down by the United States attempt to
impose morality and business ethics on the international community).
46. Clean Not Laundered, supra note 5.
47. International Group Fights Corruption, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE
(New York), Nov. 30, 1993, at 130, available in LEXIS, World Library, Tetnws File.
48. Id. at 136; Karen Pennar, A New Globo-Cop For Crooks In High Places, BUS. WEEK,
Dec. 6, 1993, at 136 (asserting financial support is coming from U.S. companies like Boeing and
General Electric).
49. David C. Scott, Organization Aims to Shed Light on Shady Deals Worldwide,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 23, 1994, at 6 ("[l]n the same way that Amnesty
International exposes human rights abuses, T.I. is a newly formed, Berlin-based organization
dedicated to exposing the misuse of public power for personal profit."); Tom Heneghan, Fight
Bribery Like Drugs, Aids--Anti-Corruption Group, REUTERS-BERLIN, May 5, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File (stating that T.I. is attempting to bring together companies
and countries that agree to crack down on corruption); Michael Holman, New Group Targets the
Roots of Corruption, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at 4.
50. George Moody-Stuart, Questions of Bribery, LONDON TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File; Michael Holman, supra note 49 (stating T.I.





Integrity"53 and branch out to other targeted countries' using quid pro quo
tactics.55
One thing is certain, this "coalition against corruption" has
developed an impressive membership roster. 6  Transparency
International's exposure tactics, public indignation, and quid pro strategy
will likely obtain more tangible results than all of the past multilateral
efforts combined. It seems clear that any anti-bribery treaty must have
Transparency International's active endorsement and support if such an
agreement stands a chance at ratification.
The OECD has decided to reanalyze and take collective action
against bribery of public officials by transnational corporations. On
December 9, 1993, the United States presented proposals to the OECD's
"Working Party on Illicit Payments" that would make international
corporate bribery a crime.57 Transparency International has further
pressured the OECD to revisit the issue.58 Negotiations went on for over
eighteen months as fears of United States extraterritorial attempts of
expanding the FCPA divided OECD ranks.59 Britain, Japan, Germany,
53. Michael Holman, Ecuador Shows Lead in International Anti-Corruption Drive, FIN.
TIMES, May 6, 1993, at 4 (stating Ecuador will be the first "Island of Integrity" as T.I. begins
its work to clean up that government).
54. Berlin Based Company Wants to Fight Corruption, REUTERS, May 31, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Reuter File (T.I. will be setting up branches in Southern Africa to
compliment their work already in Benin and Ecuador.).
55. Michael Holman, supra note 49:
What may help make the code effective is the quid pro quo tactic T.I. will employ.
Initially there may be only a few countries where business and government abide by
our code, a few "islands of integrity," as Mr. Eigen puts it [T.I. director]. The
campaign will therefore focus at the start on five or six governments in developing
countries and Eastern Europe who are prepared to support the code. These
governments--some have already had discussions with T.l.--will restrict tendering for
state contracts to corporations who have themselves signed the pledge. "We expect
these leading countries will create a momentum by their example" says Mr. Eigen.
Id.
56. Pennar, supra note 48, at 136, (Former World Bank officials and anti-corruption
experts, are among T.I.'s founders and directors.); Holman, supra note 49 (Behind the project,
nearly two years in gestation, is a group of hard-headed veterans of aid, commerce and
development, eminent in their own fields, and with experience spanning the developing world.).
57. Stella Dawson, U.S. Spearheads Effort to Ban Bribes in OECD, J. CoM., Dec. 6,
1993, at 3.
58. Rosie Waterhouse, War Declared on Corruption, INDEPENDENT, June 7, 1994, at 7;
Rosie Waterhouse, The Good Business Guide to Bribery, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 27, 1994, at 10.
59. Tara Patel, OECD Reaches Compromise on Pact to Rid Governments of Corruption, J.
COM., May 2, 1994, at 3A; George Graham, OECD to Discuss Policy Against Bribery, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at 6 (Although criminalization raises complex questions about the
extraterritorial reach of national laws, specific measures have been proposed to ensure that bribes
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and France have all refused to allow the formation of a binding criminal
agreement against corrupt payments.' Britain lead the coalition to block
the United States attempts to secure a multinational agreement against
foreign corrupt bribery since many English economists see bribe offerings
as "good business."6
Although the final agreement had not been released to the general
public at the time of writing this work,' it will fall short of criminalizing
international bribery. The guidelines are intended to be a series of
proposals that member nations can adopt.' The codes are to encourage the
review of domestic criminal, civil, and administrative regulations and to
take steps in combating bribery.' The code also encourages international
cooperation and information exchange between member nations.65 This
new agreement basically allows OECD members to pick and choose
whatever steps they deem necessary to fight bribery in international
commercial transactions.' Once again, the Unites States attempts to
criminalize transnational bribery were soundly rejected by the international
community.
The United States is again attempting to create a multinational
agreement to fight corrupt payments in international business transactions.
The United States government has decided to push the new World Trade
Organization for laws paralleling the FCPA.67 President Clinton addressed
paid by companies are not treated as tax-deductible business expenses.); George Graham, OECD
Meets in Effort to Fight Bribery, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at 5. Other OECD members are
concerned of U.S. attempts to force criminal laws onto other nations. Id.
60. Rosie Waterhouse, A Slap on the Backhanders: Trading Nations Are Finally Trying to
Crack Down on Official Bribery, INDEPENDENT, May 24, 1994, at 16; Rosie Waterhouse,
Britain Spurns U.S. Over Bribes, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 3, 1994, at 4; Rosie Waterhouse, The
Sleazy State: Britain Resisting Moves to Halt Bribes to Officials, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 16, 1994,
at 3.
61. Bribes 'Can Be Good Business', DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 31, 1993, at 4, available in
Westlaw, Int-News Database.
62. This paper is based on research available before June 12, 1994. The 1994 OECD
declaration was expected to be widely available within a month after its late June or July signing.
63. OECD Recommendation on Measures For Fighting Corruption in International




66. George Graham, U.S. Seeks OECD Foreign Bribes Ban: Many Countries Wary of
Extending Laws Beyond Their Own Frontiers, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1993, at 3 ("U.S. senior
official said the OECD working group's recommendations amounted to a shopping list from
which countries could pick one or two measures ....").
67. GATT: United States Will Urge Other Countries to Adopt Anti-Bribery Rules in New
WTO, INT'L TRADE REP., Mar. 16, 1994, at 11. (Mickey Kanter is quoted as saying: "There is
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international bribery at Miami's Summit of Americas held in December of
1994.1 Transparency International has lobbied the Clinton Administration
for just such an agenda.' It is unlikely these new attempts will secure a
multilateral agreement. Since the United States continues to demand
international criminalization of transnational bribery, it will leave the
negotiation table empty handed and its attempts will again be branded as
"extraterritorial."
One can learn from past and present attempts at adopting a legally
binding anti-corruption code. A future code based on the FCPA's
"criminalization" will be stigmatized as American "moral imperialism"
and ultimately fail. However, codes without some enforcement
mechanism will be legally non-binding and ineffective. Finally, to
effectively define a "bribe", one must evaluate each individual nation's
customs.
An analysis of past attempts to construct a universal code reveals
two general camps that emerge in the negotiation phases. These distinct
theoretical groups seem to counter each other's attempts and eventually
stifle any multinational enterprise (MNE) code.
One is known as the "maximalist position", and favors
legally binding, internationally enforceable rules of
conduct for MNEs. This position is adhered to generally
by the international trade union movement and developing
nations. The other is the so-called "minimalist position",
and promotes the notion of voluntary rather than legally
enforceable guidelines. This position is predictably
advocated by the international business community and
generally by highly capital-intensive industrialized
nations. I
With the exception of the United States, this division seems to be
true as to a country's alignment concerning both recent OECD negotiations
and acceptance of Transparency International. America and developing
no reason we shouldn't ...insist [that] our trading partners adhere to the same standards we
have been adhering to for years. It is not fair for American business to adhere to standards that
are proper and that should be adhered to around the world and others don't .. . . We are going
to insist on that ...because we see trade as a two-way street--comparability, mutuality of
obligation and were going to continue on that path."). See also Aaron Schildhaus, Stop the
Business Bribery Game, J. COM., Apr. 21, 1994, at 5.
68. Michael Holman & Stephen Fidler, Corruption Drive on Cards: American Leaders
Urged to Give Priority to Crusade, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at 5.
69. Scott, supra note 49.
70. Wallace, supra note 36.
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countries are pushing for an international agreement with strong anti-
bribery language. However, nations like Japan and Britain want only
another general proclamation and a non-binding declaration.
In between these two poles is a "zebra" position composed of both
binding and non-binding rules containing words like "should" or "shall." 7'
Realistically, a proposed international treaty against illicit payments must
satisfy both "Minimalists" and "Maximalists" and fall within the "zebra"
zone to have a chance at ratification. Furthermore, a proposed treaty must
avoid imposing criminal sanctions which led to the demise of its
predecessors." Enforcement of treaty provisions must come from non-
government entities since state officials tend to adopt broad statements of
policy but never truly act on them. Finally, any treaty must respect
principles of sovereignty if such an agreement is to be ratified.73
III. THE NEED FOR A MULTINATIONAL TREATY TO COMBAT
INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN CORRUPT PAYMENTS
Transnational illicit payments to foreign public officials demand
the world community's attention. Nations have a compelling interest to
prevent the bribery of their own officials. Such prevention can be
effective only through international cooperation. The United States'
interest in passing such a multilateral treaty is apparent considering that the
FCPA remains the only unilateral approach. An analysis of these foreign
payments shows that other nations have a vested interest in following
America's lead.
These illicit payments undermine the values which democratic
nations are founded upon. Illicit transnational payments to public officials
improperly influence and precipitate decisions potentially to the best
interests of the citizens of the host nation. " Once a bribe is accepted, the
public official is susceptible to blackmail tactics. Bribes aimed at political
parties conceptually undermine both the democratic process and diminish
71. Id.
72. Reynolds, supra note 45, at 343. States have rejected American moral imperialism
and generally have not been "particularly disposed to assist the United States out of problems of
its own making" (referring to the FCPA which put U.S. companies at a disadvantage]. Id.
73. Id. (A certain amount of caution must be exercised in attempting to appraise what are
properly national functions and what are more suitably international functions in regulating the
MNE, since the multinational enterprise has been perceived as a political as well as an economic
phenomenon, and legal "answers" and categorizations cannot be expected to eliminate all the
political repercussions stemming form MNE activity.)
74. Berlin Based Company Wants To Fight Corruption, REUTERS, May 31, 1994 available
in LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File (contending that bribery distorts decision making).
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the hope that the government will be impartial and represent the interests
of its citizens.7"
Bribery causes political instability and interferes with foreign
policy. Bribery by foreign business entities have contributed to the fall of
governments in Japan, Bolivia, Honduras, the Cook Islands, Italy, and the
Netherlands.76 A nation's ability to conduct effective foreign policy is
compromised when its national corporation's corrupt practices are
exposed." A recent transnational bribery incident involving English firms
and the government of Malaysia has caused a breakdown between the two
nations on foreign investment and trade levels." Such a breakdown could
have been prevented if an international agreement was in place. Foreign
corrupt payments also produce waste and distort prices in host countries.
The foreign official who is under the influence of a bribe, may make
decisions that are detrimental to the country's economy.79 Bribery induces
public officials to favor foreign firms which offer accommodating
payments even though such contract awards will ultimately distort
consumer prices.80 Transparency International's interim chairman has
explained:
75. Arthur Leathley & Jonathan Prynn, Labor Deputy Denounces 'Odor of Corruption',
LONDON TIMES, June 23, 1993 (Labor trade and industry spokesman is quoted as saying:
"Britain has no right to interfere in the elections of foreign countries. Foreigners have no right
to interfere in the elections of Britain. Party of the foreign millionaire was not likely to
understand the pressures on pensioners at home."); U.S. to Propose Steps Against Bribing
Foreign Officials, Kyodo News, Dec. 2, 1993, available in Westlaw, Japanecon Database
(stating that "bribery seriously undermines the very democratic institutions the OECD seeks to
promote").
76. Pines, supra note 9, at 205; See also Raymond J. Dowd, Civil Rico Misread: The
Judicial Repeal of the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 946, 947. Revelations of United States bribery of foreign officials overseas in mid-
1970's caused the resignation of many important foreign officials in Japan, Italy, and the
Netherlands. Id.
77. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 40. Dowd, supra note 76. The FCPA was
passed to prevent this vary same interference with foreign policy.
78. Malaysia Bans British Firms Over Corruption Allegations, Kyodo News, Feb. 25,
1994, available in Westlaw, Japanecon Database.
79. The Political Scene: Corruption is Spreading, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, June
1, 1993 available in Westlaw, Bus-Intl database (reporting that Mozambique politicians sell off
land cheaply to foreign investors who are bribing the decision makers); Heneghan, supra note 49
(claiming foreign illicit payments are robbing the third world of needed resources).
80. Waterhouse, supra note 58. Bribery and corrupt practices distort decision-making.
Contracts may be over-priced and therefore the country over-charged, as the contract is inflated
by as much as 20 percent to accommodate the bribe. Id. Bribes may lead to the selection of
incompetent or unscrupulous suppliers and deliberate cost-cutting. Id. The availability of "back-
handlers" may also encourage countries to buy goods and services that are unsuitable for or
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The damages to third world economies...goes
beyond the fact that the wrong supplier or contractor might
be chosen. When a government is persuaded-that is
bribed-that it needs aircraft or a food processing plant
which are unnecessary or unjustified, not only is there a
loss of scarce foreign exchange resources. Those
resources will have been deprived from worthwhile
projects.8 '
In other words, international accommodating payments promote
inefficiency and waste.
Vital world trade and investment is also a victim of bribery.
Foreign illicit payments can produce a "backlash" against the country of
origin and international business generally."8" As a result, protectionists
and isolationists ultimately gain credibility and acceptance from the local
population."
All nations have an interest in fighting bribery, but why the need
for a multilateral agreement? Applying the FCPA extraterritorially will
offend other sovereigns and ultimately create more problems."
Multinational corporations by their very nature span numerous sovereigns.
They can possess more political and economic clout than some
governments. International bribes come from entities located outside the
host country. As a result, such acts of bribery are likely beyond the
jurisdiction of the host country's law. For a country to effectively fight the
bribery of its public officials, some international tool is needed to punish
outside bribery attempts. Therefore, "[i]t is necessary to have
international measures that match the international dimensions of this
surplus to their needs. Id. See also, Yuri Lopatin, OECD Urges Step-Up of Action Against
Corruption in Trade, Tass, June 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Tass File.
81. Holman, supra note 49.
82. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 40.
83. Id.
84. DIETER LANGE & GARY BORN, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL
LAWS 3 (ICC 1987) states:
I. Extraterritoriality creates considerable commercial and legal uncertainty,
particularly where unpredictable applications of national competition and securities
laws are involved. This uncertainty discourages international businesses from engaging
in productive trade and investment .... 2. The overall impact of the extraterritorial
application of national laws is to discourage or prevent useful economic activity in the
from of international investment, and to reduce the profitability of existing investment.
This distortion of market processes, caused by extraterritoriality, reduces productive
economic activity and the employment opportunities and income that would flow form
such activity.
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problem."85 A multinational treaty is the only way to effectively deter
foreign corrupt practices."
In light of the past attempts to form an international agreement and
the need for a multinational approach, this author proposes a solution to
the problem of corrupt overseas payments.87 This work proposes a
mechanism of enforcement based on private causes of action rather than
making accommodation payments a crime, an approach that has doomed
earlier agreements. This work also uses the tools of disclosure and
exposure to deter possible offenders. Finally, the proposed treaty respects
each individual nation's political and cultural customs regarding
accommodating payments. As a result, this unique draft has a better
chance at ratification and deterrence than previous multinational
agreements.
The preamble of this proposed treaty sets forth recitals and the
ultimate goal to be achieved. The recitals are necessary to establish why
transnational bribery is detrimental to individual nations and the world
community as a whole. The recitals conclude by stating that only
multilateral cooperation can eliminate these illicit payments. The purpose
of the strong condemnation language in the resolution clause is to reflect
the world community's intention to completely eliminate this form of
corruption."8 These statements are modeled after language adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly.89
Identifiable terms are essential to the treaty if it is to be functional.
Therefore, Article I sets forth concise definitions of terms used throughout
the treaty which would otherwise impede its effectiveness. The definition
of the term "corrupt payment" is taken in light of the host country's laws.
Likewise, local laws concerning the definition of the word "illegal" are
paramount when a corrupt payment is alleged to have occurred.
References to local laws are an effort to respect the world's diverse
85. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 40.
86. United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations: Information paper on the
negotiations to Complete the Code on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/1983/S/2
of Jan. 4, 1983, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 177 (1993) sec. 3. See also ICC Guidelines, supra note
26 (introductory comments stating that "Complementary and mutually reinforcing action by both
governments and the business community is essential.").
87. See infra pp. 31-39. Proposed Treaty on the Prevention of Illicit Payments (using
language adopted from existing domestic and international documents).
88. A. A. Fatouros, On the Implementation of International Codes of Conduct: An
Analysis of Future Experience, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 941, 943, 947 (1981) (explaining that states
seem to define a code of conduct as a legal instrument embodying a set of principles and rules
that limit the behavior of international actors).
89. G.A. Res. 3514, supra note 37.
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cultures and legal systems when it comes to defining bribery. By
acknowledging individual local laws and avoiding a universal definition of
these terms, this treaty guards the notions of sovereignty and increases its
chances of ratification.'
Article I defines the term "intermediary" and "international
commercial transaction" in a manner that is parallel to ECOSOC's
proposed treaty.9' The definition of the term "knowingly" is similar to the
definition of the term "scienter" in the FCPA, and encompasses the "knew
or should of known standard" that is essential to avoiding the defense of
ignorance. The "reason to know" standard of the 1977 FCPA has not
been adopted because it was perceived by many American businessmen
and legal advisors as too vague and confusing . The definition of the term
"offended private party" is an attempt to limit the number of parties who
may bring an action by imposing a standing requirement. The term
"payment" is broadly defined to include any pecuniary gain or social
advantage that realistically could influence the decision of a public official.
Language from both ECOSOC's proposed treaty93 and the FCPA help to
broadly define the term "public official" so that it includes almost any
governmental decision maker. Finally, the definition of "suspect private
party" allows all transnational corporations to fall under this treaty even
though their home country may not be a signatory to it. By holding all
international commercial entities accountable, this treaty will be a true
deterrence from the common practice of commercial bribery.
Article II is an attempt to clearly define what activities will not be
tolerated. Article II sets forth specific conduct which is more succinct than
the vague wording of the ICC guidelines and OECD general
pronouncements.' This article therefore clearly puts forth standards of
conduct that individual entities can realistically be held accountable to.
Article II establishes enforceable criteria, and targets corrupt payments or
90. Chelminski, Pots of Wine, SAT. REV., July 9, 1977, at 14; SCHAFFER, supra note 6,
at 416-19 (discussing cultural differences as to what is "illegal" or "accepted" in the context of
bribery).
91. U.N. ECOSOC, supra note 40, at 3.
92. Gary M. Elder & Mark S. Sableman, Negligence is Not Corruption: The Scienter
Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (1981)
(addressing the uncertainty of the original FCPA scienter requirement); see also SWAN &
MURPHY, supra note 23, at 263-73.
93. U.N. ECOSOC, supra note 40, at 3.
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(1), 2(h)(2) (West 1991).
95. Compare G.A. Res. 3514, supra note 37 (ambiguosly stating condemned behavior and
what should be done by home government in response to said behavior) with U.N. ECOSOC,
supra note 40, art. 1, sec. 1 (enumerating behavior in violation of proposed treaty).
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offers thereof to political parties and to public officials." Since most
nations criminalize bribery of their public officials, this treaty should be
limited to multinational commercial transactions and not domestic bribery.
Accordingly, article II concludes with a limiting phrase restricting this
agreement to international commercial transactions.
Article III sets forth affirmative defenses and further limits the
scope and applicability of this agreement. It adopts the logical and often
used defenses found in the FCPA. 9  Section (a) of this article also honors
an individual nation's laws and the general notions of sovereignty. Section
(a) and other provisions which defer to national laws, neutralize any
charges of extraterritoriality. Such charges have consistently been brought
up in OECD discussions and have ultimately derailed negotiations on the
formation of an international anti-bribery treaty.98
Section (d) of Article III expands available affirmative defenses
even further. A "good faith" defense is created so that an administrative
board has the flexibility to decide each case in light of the particular facts
and circumstances surrounding a transaction. Furthermore, a reliance
defense based on an advisory opinion is available to possible respondents.
This defense will promote the use of the advisory opinion process
established in Article VIII, and can offer clear advice to avoid possible
bribery scenarios. A similar process is utilized in the FCPA. 9
Article IV is a necessary provision in this draft. This Article
requires accounting procedures which are essential to realistically detecting
alleged illicit payments. This Article encourages states to supplement their
current accounting procedures by adopting bookkeeping standards
promulgated by the Article VII Committee. Forcing signatory countries to
adopt Committee accounting standards would be seen as an attempt to
abrogate a sovereign's rule making authority and would be rejected by
most states. However, these disclosure requirements may prevent future
bribes."°  Therefore, each individual state should be allowed to decide
96. See U.N. ECOSOC, supra note 40, art. 6 (modeled after 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1)-
(2), -(2)(a)(1)-(2) (1988)).
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b)-(c), 78dd-2(b)-(c) (1988).
98. Patel, supra note 59; see Reynolds, supra note 45.
99. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(e), -2(f) (West 1991) (opinions of the Attorney General).
100. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 42-43. This approach [disclosure] involves the
public reporting of foreign payments. The underlying idea is, as Justice Brandeis said:
[T]hat sunlight is the best disinfectant .... The simplicity of these requirements
makes them relatively easy to enforce. No question about intent, or reasonable
knowledge that a bribe would be paid to a foreign official, will arise. The minimum
thresholds would eliminate any need to report the relatively innocuous "grease"
payments. These disclosures could be made annually and with a significant time delay
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whether it will adopt the Committee accounting procedures, so long as
their procedures are sufficient to track corrupt payments.
Article V's purpose is to place the international business
community on notice of this treaty. This Article is an attempt to inform all
international business contractors that a treaty is in existence and they
should be aware of its provisions. Like Article IV, this part uses the
phrase "under penalty of law." This is merely an enforcement mechanism
to encourage international business contractors to circulate this clause in
their agreements. Each signatory country will directly determine and
enforce this phrase within its territory. However, the failure of a
sovereign to do so may result in Article II (a)(iii) arbitration.
The present tax deductions of illicit payments should cease if the
international community is serious about combating these bribes."'t Article
VI encourages signatories to disallow tax deductions for illicit payments.
This Article may now be more warmly received since many States have
recently questioned or abandoned their legislation which allows these
deductions. '" Without Article VI, the laws of signatories, which
encourage overseas bribery, would circumvent this draft's recitals and
resolutions.
The use of the word "should" in Article VI is an attempt to cater
to "Minimalists." 3 However, the presence of Article VI appeases
"Maximalists" as well. If a signatory country wishes to preserve its
present bribery tax deduction laws, its multilateral companies will be more
inclined to offer bribes. As a result, businesses in these countries are more
likely to be "suspect private parties" in this treaty's review process. After
several adverse Article XII Certifications are filed against a country's
multinational corporations, that nation will be economically pressured to
repeal its tax deduction regulations. The economic benefit of these
after the year-end, in order to protect a corporation's legitimate interest in the secrecy
of ongoing negotiations .. . . If known in advance that embarrassing payments would
have to be disclosed, most such payments would not be solicited or made. In this
modest way, we might achieve an international regime to ensure that foreign bribery is
finally halted.
Id.
101. Id. at 38-39 (noting states "have endorsed high-level policy statements against corrupt
payments," but foreign countries' tax deduction for bribes show an inherent legitimization
problem).
102. Switzerland: Bribes May Soon Become Nondeductible, supra note 7; Patel, supra note
59, at 3A.
103. Wallace, supra note 36, at 443. This phrase makes Article VI nonbinding and
satisfies minimalists since they believe: "Any code of conduct for transnational corporations
should not be binding, since the diversity of national situations makes it impossible to apply
uniform rules to all countries." Id.
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deductions to a country would be offset by the loss of international
business. Therefore, this Article is also an attempt to find middle ground
between both camps and increase the chances of ratification.
The Corrupt Practices Committee is one of the two regulatory
bodies created by this draft. The administration of this treaty is left to the
Corrupt Practices Committee and the Corrupt Practices Commission since
past experience has revealed that states lack the necessary attitude to fight
overseas corrupt payments."' Article VII establishes the Corrupt Practices
Committee with the responsibility for the treaty's smooth operation.
Sections (a), (b), and (d) establish the membership of this Committee.
The membership compensation assures neutrality and gives signatory
countries a chance to participate in the rule making process in order to
protect their sovereign rights.
Article VII (a)(iii) arbitration is one of the various powers and
responsibilities the Corrupt Practices Committee will receive. "In-house"
disputes between members should be settled in arbitration to lessen the
chance of a mutual recession of the agreement. Another important
provision in Article VII is the Committee's ability to create supportive
subcommittees. These inferior bodies will aid in administering the
Committee's various functions. Sections (a)(iv) and (g) set up a
mechanism of checks and balances between the treaty's regulatory bodies.
An advisory opinion process, similar to the FCPA's, is also
provided by this draft agreement. Article VIII requires that all requests
must originate by possible "offending private parties" or signatory
countries. This Article further limits the review procedure to
nonhypothetical situations. All of these committee advisory opinions
should logically be privately heard to avoid public disclosure of
surrounding facts. This is to safeguard international business leads and
promote the use of this process. Article VIII requires a mandatory
fourteen day response period which is aimed at avoiding the problems of
delay that have discredited the FCPA.0"
The second body created by the proposed treaty, the Corrupt
Practices Commission, is established by Article IX. This would be
considered the judicial body of the treaty since its main function is to hear
disputes concerning possible corrupt practices. This body is a combination
of nationals from various signatory countries. Sections (a) and (b)
structures this body to allow all member states some participation in the
judicial review process. Section (b) ensures that a "suspect private party"
104. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 38-39 (claiming many countries seem
unreliable and uninterested in fighting these illicit payments).
105. Albright & Hon, supra note 25.
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from a signatory country will not be judged by a commission composed
entirely of foreigners. By allowing at least one fellow national to
participate in the complaint process, "suspect private parties" may feel that
proceedings will be more equitable.
One of the more controversial provisions of this treaty is found in
Article IX (a)(ii). This subsection gives the Corrupt Practices Commission
international discovery powers. In light of the fact that a multinational
agreement was necessary to facilitate international discovery,'" this
subsection is somewhat controversial. However, this provision is
necessary to facilitate the investigatory stage of any proceeding. These
discovery powers would only be possessed by the Commission and not the
individual private parties. Article XV (a) would protect sovereignty rights
since each nation is only obligated to assist in discovery to the degree their
national laws allow.
Article X's nature is one of limitation. It restricts the right to file a
complaint to certain entities and provides for a statute of limitations. To
prevent the filing of frivolous complaints by private parties, Article X
provides for the award of attorney's fees if the Corrupt Practices
Commission finds that a complaint was not filed in good faith. Article X
is one of the unique factors which distinguishes the proposed treaty from
its predecessors. This Article provides for a private cause of action, which
may be a more effective means at controlling corrupt payments. 7 As a
result, nations would not be responsible for coming forth with allegations;
rather independent private entities would pursue their claims.
The most controversial provision is located in Article XI. Article
XI provides a confidential complaint procedure to guard internationally
sensitive business documents. Section (b) sets forth the standard of proof
in these proceedings. Since bribery is shielded in the "shadows" of
commercial trade, its very nature is one of secrecy and underhandedness.
As a result, evidence is hard to obtain. Therefore, an evidentiary standard
of "more likely than not" is the most appropriate standard of proof for
plaintiffs to meet. More stringent standards would be impossible to prove.
"Suspect private parties" are in a better position to prove the
nonoccurrence of a bribe since they were supposedly in union with the
governmental authorities they allegedly bribed. This standard is fair since
106. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Hague Evidence Convention, June 1, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241.
107. Pines, supra note 9, at 191 (claiming that a cause of action in the FCPA would
significantly improve enforcement of the Act); RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 38-39
(claiming that many countries seem unreliable and uninterested in fighting these illicit payments).
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"suspect private parties" can more easily account for all their
expenditures.
Article XI section (c) is another controversial provision. This
section creates a presumption of guilt if one party refuses to take part in
the complaint process. This vital provision will encourage participation in
the judicial process and help facilitate the facts surrounding transnational
commercial activities. However, some signatory countries may find this
provision offensive to local constitutional laws or rules of evidence. This
section could be interpreted as infringing on one's right against self
incrimination. Furthermore, many countries would perceive this as a
violation of the presumption of innocence that all suspects should be
afforded.
However, this provision is not as controversial as potential critics
would suggest for two reasons. First, Article XV limits the applicability of
Article XI (c) since it provides for the respect of laws of contracting
nations. Second, this treaty is not criminal in nature and only establishes
civil causes of action. Criminal liability will only attach if the "suspect
private party's" home state has adopted legislation similar to the FCPA.
Article XI concludes with provisions that concern the disposition
of a claim. Subsection (d)(i) provides that if a corrupt payment is not
discovered, the Committee will seal the proceeding's records to protect
confidential business.'08 This subsection also empowers the Committee the
option of awarding attorney's fees. Subsection (d)(ii) orders the release of
all documents to both parties if a claim is certified (i.e. a corrupt payment
is discovered). This provision is targeted at supplying the "offended
private party" with necessary documentation to facilitate a civil suit which
may be filed pursuant to Article XII (c).
Article XII (a) mandates that the Corrupt Practices Committee
announce its findings to the general public. This essential provision is a
method of punishing transnational businesses that participate in corrupt
practices, and it also deters future businesses from offering bribes to public
officials. An international business does not want to be stigmatized as a
corrupt and bribing entity because public opinion of that business would
become unfavorable resulting in a backlash against that company's goods
and services. Therefore, the tactic of exposing and announcing the
corruption to the world would be an effective deterrent and punishment
even without criminal sanctions attaching. This tactic is used by
108. This provision is to avoid one of the draw backs of the FCPA's advisory opinion
process. See SCHAFFER, supra note 6, at 423 (stating that the FCPA review process has the
potential to disclose information to international competitors and thus is not often used).
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Transparency International to counter world corrupt payments and may be
more effective then any fine or penalty.'
Under Article XII (b), all signatory countries agree to refrain from
doing business with "suspect private parties" who are determined to have
bribed a public official. This provision's detrimental to multinational
corporations that bribe public officials because they could lose a substantial
amount of transnational contracts. Section (c) allows an "offended private
party" to file a lawsuit in its home country. Although section (d)
encourages signatory countries to honor the foreign judgments for
collection purposes, it still preserves a country's right to question such
foreign judgments." 0
International criminalization of transnational bribery of public
officials would be ideal from the American standpoint. However, past
attempts by the United States to secure such provisions have doomed
multilateral negotiations and have been labeled as "American
Imperialism.""' Therefore, Article XIII only encourages countries to
adopt penal laws to counter overseas bribery by their nationals. However,
with or without these penal laws, this treaty's effectiveness is based on a
civil recourse that will eventually make bribery economically cost
inefficient.
Article XV (a) protects a contracting nation's sovereignty by
preventing the proposed treaty from contradicting its laws. This provision
preserves a nation's sovereignty and reduces the need for reservations
which ultimately would be filed to protect national laws. It is also
important to provide financial support for the bodies created by this treaty.
Therefore, section XV (a) secures funds for the Commission and
Committee by requiring all signatories to provide assistance for the
"general operation of this treaty."
Articles XIV and XVI are procedural items. Article XIV is
created so that member states can monitor each other's compliance. This
is a common and necessary provision in many treaties."' Article XIV
becomes a necessary provision because the actions of states have often
contradicted their publicly stated policies regarding overseas bribery.
109. Scott, supra note 49, at 6.
110. Sec. (d) is modeled after Article 54 of the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (Mar. 18, 1965), reprinted in
4 I.L.M. 532 (1965).
111. Reynolds, supra note 45, at 343.
112. Kenneth Abbott, Trust But Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control
Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1993) (stating that
clauses providing mechanisms of monitoring promote trust among signatory parties and dispel
many wrongful accusations).
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Article XVI delays the commencement of responsibilities under this treaty
until there is a sufficient number of contracting nations."' This practical
provision is modeled after a suggested change to the Economic and Social
Council's draft treaty."
4
This purposed treaty is unique but controversial. Formation of a
treaty is a ritual of stages."' The purpose of this work is to provide the
first step in this diplomatic process. Its other purpose is to promote critical
thought on this issue. Proposing a treaty that contains some very
controversial provisions will surely touch the nerves of many international
legal practitioners. However, this draft is not so controversial as to be
unattainable. Its provisions are targeted to preserve the sovereignty of
individual nations, and it appeases both Maximalist and Minimalist
theorists. This treaty is feasible and it can be ratified by enough nations to
effectively deter illicit payments in the global market place. The key is to
secure its acceptance by the world community.
V. STRATEGIES TO SECURE SIGNATORIES
The ratification of this treaty, like many other international
documents, will be a slow tedious process. There are various ways to
secure the world community's acceptance. Unfortunately, acceptance of
this treaty will not occur quickly, and it will be accompanied by
considerable debate. However, once enough signatories are mustered,
world opinion will most likely force the remaining countries to enter into
the treaty. Their failure to sign this treaty may result in a "Sleazy State"
stigmatization. 6
The vital ingredient in the ratification process is the willingness of
the United States to compromise. Congress must realize that it will not
succeed in cloning the FCPA into an international treaty."" The United
States should embrace this treaty because of its unprecedented potential at
curtailing corrupt payments. Even though the language and penalties are
113. Bonnie Jenkins, The Role of the Attorney in the Treaty Making Process, 6 INT'L L.
PRACTICUM 29 (1993) (stating that such provisional application clauses are not uncommon and
serve a useful and necessary purpose).
114. U.N. ECOSOC, supra note 40. Notes accompanying the draft discuss the addition of
an "Article 13" which contains provisions on entry into force. Id.
115. Kenneth Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretation Form a Negotiator's Perspective, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1988) (stating that the process of treaty formation includes text
presentation, issue identification and issue resolution).
116. Waterhouse, The Sleazy State: Britain Resisting Moves to Halt Bribes to Officials,
supra note 60, at 3.
117. Repeated past attempts have failed. See id. at 10-20.
19951
28 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 1
inferior to the FCPA, the United States should compromise and push for
its international acceptance. Once the acceptance of the treaty by the
United States is attained, the first step in the ratification process will be
complete.
Once the United States supports this draft, America's economic
and political power can be a valuable tool in facilitating the adoption of
this treaty by the world community. The United States' foreign policy
must reflect its firm commitment to fight foreign corrupt practices. Now
that the cold war is over, America can be more flexible with its foreign
policy and aid. As a result, the United States could restrict its foreign aid
to signatories of this draft. This policy would greatly increase the number
of parties to this agreement. The United States could place this draft on
the "bargaining table" during the next round of General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade negotiation sessions. This would start dialogue on the
topic and publicly expose those countries who are reluctant to fight
bribery. The United States could also condition future bilateral friendship,
commerce, and navigation treaties on the prerequisite that its partner be a
signatory to this treaty.
Directing the public's attention to certain transactions or
governmental actors is a vital tool in securing this treaty's acceptance." 8
Therefore, Transparency International is an essential group that can help to
secure ratification of this treaty. Transparency International's unique
status as an independent organization allows it to confront and expose
foreign corruption without jeopardizing "political relations".
Transparency International could use its tactics to target certain
key countries and indirectly force them to become signatories. For
example, Transparency International could promote a public campaign
designed to expose English officials who take bribes." 9 A powerful media
campaign uncovering graft in the English government would likely enrage
English citizens and force local politicians to address the issue.2 0
Eventually, the issue would become detrimental to any English politician
who disfavors the signing of such a treaty. Once England becomes a
signatory, another country is targeted and a "snowball" affect will
eventually occur.
118. This is an effective tactic used by T.I. through its Directors who write letters to local
press agencies. See e.g., Implications of British Overseas Aid, TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, available
in LEXIS, World Library, TTimes File (letter written by Jeremy Pope, Managing. Director of
T.I.); Questions of Bribery, TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TTimes
File) (letter written by George Moody-Stuart Chairmen of T.I. in the United Kingdom).
119. England is used for illustrative purposes only. The author does not suggest that
English Officials are necessarily corrupt.
120. The FCPA was born out of the same public outrage. See Timmeny, supra note 11.
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Introducing this draft as a protocol or a supplemental document to
an existing treaty may help facilitate its acceptance. There are currently
treaties in place that this agreement could logically supplement.'2 ' The
strategy is to target an existing treaty that is logically related to this
agreement. This draft would become an extension of the already
established goals of operational treaties and thus cast it in a less radical
light.
Despite its inadequate attempts to date, the OECD is still a vital
actor in the adoption of this treaty. The majority of multinational
corporations can be found within the territory of OECD member
nations.' Furthermore, the bulk of international commerce comes from
nations in the OECD.' Any treaty receiving the blessing of the OECD
will significantly affect international foreign corrupt practices. Therefore,
Transparency International and the United States should concentrate on
pressuring individual OECD members to become signatories. A
combination of diplomatic maneuvering and political pressure arising from
the discontent of the public, can result in the world community's leaders
embracing this treaty.
VI. CONCLUSION
Transnational bribery has been an issue before the world
community for a generation now. Prior multinational attempts at reducing
these illicit payments have been ineffective. The United States continued
demands for the international "criminalization" will again be labeled as
"moral imperialism" and will be met by considerable opposition from
other nations. Cloning a treaty after the FCPA is not the answer to this
problem. The proposed multilateral agreement has the potential of both
controlling overseas accommodation payments and receiving the
international community's acceptance. New organizations and a new
world order makes the timing right for this proposed draft to be submitted
to world leaders. As a result, this operational, effective, and ratifiable
agreement could be the first real multinational deterrent to foreign
corruption.
121. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between State and Nationals of
Other States, 17 U.S.T. 1270, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965) Convention Establishing the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, done at Seoul S. Korea, Oct. 11, 1985, reprinted in
24 I.L.M. 1598 (1985).
122. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 42; OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, Report by the Secretary-General, Annex 4 at 99 (1977) reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 969
(1976) note item #2.
123. LANGE & BORN, supra note 84, at 52.
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PROPOSED TREATY ON THE PREVENTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CORRUPT PAYMENTS
WHEREAS international commercial transactions have become
more common and increasingly facilitated by corrupt payments to public
officials;
WHEREAS such corrupt payments are socially undesirable;
WHEREAS acceptance of these corrupt payments erode the public's
confidence in their state's leadership;
WHEREAS several governments have become politically unstable
due to the exposure of these ongoing corrupt payments;
WHEREAS such corrupt payments increasingly cause international
incidents and strain relations between nations;
WHEREAS such corrupt payments are detrimental to a nation's
ability to secure goods and services at an economically efficient and fair
price;
WHEREAS such corrupt payments deprive legitimate entities from
securing international commercial contracts;
WHEREAS such corrupt payments originate from transnational
corporations and can only be eliminated through multinational cooperation;
WE ARE RESOLVED to condemn and eliminate all corrupt practices
of bribery of a public official by transnational corporations, their
intermediaries, and others involved in violation of the laws and regulations
of Host Countries.
ARTICLE I
For the purpose of this Agreement:
(a) "Commission" means the Corrupt Practices Commission created by
Article IX.
(b) "Committee" means the Corrupt Practices Committee created by
Article VII.
(c) "Corrupt Payment" shall be defined by the host state's internal laws
concerning illegal payments, bribes, or gratuities to governmental
entities at the time of the alleged act taken in account all host state
rulings, codes, regulations, cases, or written opinions construing or
creating these internal laws.
(d) "Host State" means the sovereign territory in which the alleged
recipient or benefactor of a corrupt payment holds a "public official"
position.
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(e) "Home State" means the sovereign territory in which the Offended
Private Party is incorporated or, if the Offended Private Party is a
natural person, means his or her domiciliary State.
(f) "Illegal" shall be defined by the Host State's internal criminal or
penal laws concerning illicit payments to public officials taken in
account with all Host State rulings, codes, regulations, cases, or
written opinions construing or creating these internal laws.
(g) "Intermediary" means any enterprise or any other person, whether
juridical or natural, who negotiates with or otherwise deals with a
public official on behalf of any other enterprise or any other person,
whether juridical or natural, in connection with an international
commercial transaction;
(h) "International commercial transaction" means any sale, contract, or
any other business transaction, actual or proposed, with a national,
regional, local government, any authority or agency referred to in
paragraph (1) of this article. International commercial transaction
also refers to any business transaction involving an application for
governmental approval of a sale, contract, or any other business
transaction, actual or proposed, relating to the supply or purchase of
goods, services, capital, or technology emanating, wholly or
substantially, from a State or States other than the one in which those
goods, services, capital, or technology are to be delivered or
rendered. It also means any application for or acquisition of
proprietary interest or production rights from a government by a
foreign national or enterprise;
(i) "Knowingly" (with respect to conduct) means being aware that such
a person, intermediary, agent, subsidiary, or any entity is engaging
in conduct in violation of this Agreement or that such circumstances
exist that should reasonably place a party on notice that a result is
substantially certain to occur, or has occurred, from conduct in
violation of this Agreement.
(j) "Offended Private Party" means aggrieved private person or legal
corporate entity which, through loss of a possible contract, is
damaged by a corrupt payment. The Offended Private Party must
have been a legitimate business competitor to the Suspect Private
Party and in direct competition with the Suspect Private Party in
securing a contract involving an international commercial
transaction.
(k) "Payment" means the delivery of any item or intangible of value.
(1) "Public official" means any person, whether appointed or elected,
whether permanently or temporary:
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(i) Who, at the national, regional or local level holds a
legislative, administrative, judicial or military office or
who holds such an office in an international
intergovernmental organization; or
(ii) Who, in performing a public function is an employee of
an international intergovernmental organization or of a
government or of a public or governmental authority or
agency or who otherwise performs a public function;
(in) "Suspect Private Party" means any person or legal corporate entity
which is suspected of violating this Agreement by knowingly
making, offering, or allowing another on their behalf to make or
offer a corrupt payment. A Suspect Private Party does not
necessarily have to be a domiciliary of a signatory country.
ARTICLE II
It is a violation of this Agreement to knowingly offer, promise, or
give, directly or indirectly, or through an intermediary, any corrupt
payment to:
(a) a public official or intermediary for the purposes of influencing any
act or decision of such public official in his official capacity, or
induce such public official to do, or omit to do, any illegal act in
violation of the lawful duty of such public official; or
(b) a public official or intermediary in an attempt to induce a public
official to influence a foreign government or instrumentality thereof
to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality; or
(c) any political party or official thereof or any candidate for political
office for the purpose of influencing any act or decision of such
party, official, or candidate in their official capacity, or induce such
party, official, or candidate to do or omit to do an act in violation of
the lawful duty of such party, official, or candidate in connection
with an international commercial transaction.
ARTICLE III
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under this Agreement
that:
(a) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was
made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the
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foreign officiil's or candidate's political party, party official, or
country; or
(b) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value, was a
reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging
expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, public
official, or candidate and was directly related to:
(i) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of
'products or services; or
(ii) the execution or performance of a contract with a
foreign government or agency thereof; or
(c) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value was to
facilitate or expedite payment to a public official, political party, or
party official, and the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure
the performance of a routine governmental action by the public
official, political party, or party official, and such payment is not in
violation of Host State's internal laws; or
(d) the Suspected Private Party was acting in good faith or in accordance
with an advisory opinion rendered pursuant to Article VIII of this
Agreement.
ARTICLE IV
Each signatory country shall ensure that enterprises or other
juridical persons established in its territory maintain, under penalty of law,
accurate records of payments made by them to an intermediary, or
received by them as an intermediary, in connection with an international
commercial transaction. Each signatory country agrees to consider for
adoption all accounting procedures promulgated by the Committee. All
transnational payments over $10,000.00 to public officials or political
parties should be disclosed to the Committee on an annual basis.
ARTICLE V
Each signatory country shall require, under penalty of law, that
enterprises or other juridical persons established in its territory include the
following clause in all transnational commercial transaction contracts:
"One or more of the parties to this transnational commercial
transaction is bound by the Treaty on the Prevention of International
Corrupt Payments. Both parties are aware of the existence and details of
said treaty. A contracting party, of this contract, from a signatory country
verifies that no corrupt payments were offered or delivered in violation of
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this treaty. Any contracting party, of this contract, from a signatory
country must keep accurate accounting records pursuant to Article IV of
said treaty and is encouraged to solicit advisory opinions on questionable
transactions pursuant to Article VIII of said treaty."
ARTICLE VI
Each signatory country should refrain from permitting tax
deductions on expenditures that are determined to be "corrupt payments."
ARTICLE VII
(a) This Agreement establishes the Corrupt Practices Committee
composed of fifteen (15) representatives from signatory countries
who will be known as Counselors. The Counselors shall meet
routinely and:
(i) promulgate accounting rules that are intended to prevent
and disclose corrupt payments in international
commercial transactions; and
(ii) render advisory opinions pursuant to Article VIII of this
Agreement; and
(iii) arbitrate all disputes between signatory countries
concerning the interpretation of and enforcement of this
Agreement; and
(iv) formulate and amend the procedural rules of the Corrupt
Practices Commission.
(b) The Counselors shall be elected by signatory countries every three
(3) years serving staggered terms of three years. The candidates for
this committee shall possess excellent credentials. Each signatory
country is limited to having only one (1) national on this regulatory
board at any given time.
(c) The Committee shall formulate rules of procedure concerning its
responsibilities.
(d) All Committee Counselors shall be neutral, impartial decision
makers and be of the highest moral character.
(e) The Committee shall work closely with all nations and regional
organizations to combat corrupt payments in international
commercial transactions.
(f) The Committee shall create, coordinate and administer all necessary
support staff and committees as it deems necessary to carry out its
obligations under this treaty.
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(g) The Committee shall hear petitions to recuse a member of the
Corrupt Practices Commission, and replace a commissioner if
necessary.
ARTICLE VIII
All signatory countries persons, companies, or corporate entities
may request an advisory opinion concerning a questionable situation that
may, or may not, be a corrupt payment. Hypothetical situations will not
be considered by the Committee. All requests must be filed by possible
offending private parties or signatory governments and be supported by all
the facts sufficient for the Committee to render a reliable advisory opinion.
Upon receiving a valid advisory opinion request the Committee shall:
(a) Immediately analyze the provided facts; request more information
from the filing party if necessary; and render an opinion within
fourteen (14) days; and
(b) Not disclose the identities of any of the parties involved or the facts
surrounding the advisory opinion unless an Offended Private Party
raises the affirmative defense of relying on an advisory opinion
pursuant to this section and in defense of corruption complaint filed
pursuant to Article X of this Agreement.
ARTICLE IX
(a) This Agreement establishes the Corrupt Practices Commission
composed of seven (7) Commissioners from signatory countries
elected by signatory countries, with individual tenure of five years,
serving in staggered terms. All Commissioners should be neutral,
impartial decision makers possessing the highest moral character.
No two Commissioners shall be from the same signatory country.
The Commission shall have the power to:
(i) hear all complaints filed pursuant to Article X of this
Agreement; and
(ii) to discover all documents, depose witnesses, and audit
accounting records kept pursuant to Article IV of this
agreement; and
(iii) interpret Host Country laws on corrupt payments; and
(iv) certify a cause in which it believes a corrupt payment
has taken place in violation of this treaty; and
(v) award attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing party; and
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(vi) request a bond be posted by an alleged Offended Private
Party to assure that an innocent Suspect Private Party
can recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
(b) A Suspect Private Party can demand the replacement of one of the
Commissioners which will be replaced with a Commissioner from
the Suspect Private Party's domiciliary State if:
(i) There are presently no Commissioners sharing the same
nationality of the Suspect Private Party; and
(ii) The Suspect Private Party is from a signatory country.
ARTICLE X
An Offended Private Party of a signatory country has the right to
file a complaint with the Commission alleging a corrupt payment was
made or offered in an international commercial transaction. Both the
Offended Private Party and Suspect Private Party have the right to notice,
opportunity to be heard, and ability to produce evidence on their behalf.
A complaint must be filed within 180 days of the alleged corrupt payment
and be based on good faith. If the Commission finds that a complaint was
not filed in good faith, then the Suspect Private Party may be awarded
attorney's fees and costs to be paid by the complaining Offended Private
Party.
ARTICLE XI
(a) The Commission's complaint procedure shall consist of:
(i) Notifying all parties concerned in the complaint; and
(ii) Confidential investigation of the entire circumstances
surrounding the alleged corrupt payment; and
(iii) Collecting evidence through subpoenas and depositions
to render a fair decision;
(b) The Commission must establish, by competent evidence, that more
likely than not, a corrupt payment occurred.
(c) A presumption of a corrupt payment arises if the Suspect Private
Party refuses to honor a Commission's discovery request or refuses
to take part in these proceedings.
(d) If the Commission finds that:
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(i) a corrupt payment has not occurred, the proceedings
shall be closed and all documents shall be sealed. The
alleged Offended Private Party may be ordered to pay
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by the
Suspect Private Party.
(ii) a corrupt payment has occurred, the cause will be
"Certified" and all records and documents will be turned
over to the both the Offended Private Party and the
Suspect Private Party.
ARTICLE XII
Upon certification of a cause:
(a) The Commission shall release a public statement that describes its
findings and conclusions.
(b) Signatory countries shall bar the Suspect Private Party from doing
business within its territory for a period of Ten (10) years; and
(c) The Offended Private Party has the right to sue, under a contract
interference tort theory, if one is available in his/its Home State and
if that Home State is a signatory to this Agreement.
(d) All signatory countries agree to recognize and enforce foreign
judgments of fellow signatory countries in civil/private causes of
action described in subsection (c) of this Article. This section shall
not be interpreted in denying a signatory country the right to refuse
enforcement of foreign judgments if such refusal is consistent with
local laws, standing treaties and/or international legal principles.
ARTICLE XIII
Signatory countries are encouraged to pass local legislation
criminalizing corrupt payments in international commercial transactions.
However in no way is this Agreement to be interpreted to:
(a) require a signatory country to adopt criminal legislation concerning
international commercial transactions; or
(b) exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with the
national law of a signatory country.
ARTICLE XIV
Contracting States shall inform each other upon request of
measures taken in the implementation of this Agreement.
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ARTICLE XV
(a) Contracting States shall afford one another, the Committee and
Commission the greatest possible measure of assistance in
connection with investigations and proceedings brought pursuant to
this Agreement, as far as permitted under their national laws, and all
Contracting States shall provide assistance in the general operation
of this treaty.
(b) Contracting States shall, upon mutual agreement, enter into
negotiations towards the conclusion of bilateral agreements with each
other to facilitate the provision of mutual assistance in accordance
with this article.
(c) The provisions of this article shall not affect obligations under any
other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern,
in whole or in part, mutual assistance in legal matters.
ARTICLE XVI
This Agreement shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date
of deposit of the Twenty-second (22nd) instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession. The instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
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